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NOTES
The majority also demonstrates an inclination to retreat from the
Griggs rationale of recognizing discrimination by the impact, rather than
the intent, of the practice. Since the Court will now uphold a seniority
system whose adoption was not racially motivated, the test of discrimina-
tion will focus on the intent in adoption rather than on the discriminatory
effects of the seniority system. Good faith, although not a defense under
the disparate impact theory, presumably could be a valid defense to
discrimination thus defined. These consequences are inevitable in the shift
from the prior jurisprudential test of "perpetuation" to the new test of
"motivation."
Teamsters marks a departure from the more easily proved Quarles
rationale by distinguishing between a discriminatory seniority system and
a seniority system which is not exempt from Title VII. While Quarles and
its progeny essentially equated discriminatory with non-exempt, the ma-
jority now holds that a seniority system may be discriminatory in operation
but be immunized from Title VII prohibitions. New factors introduced by
the Court demonstrate that a greater amount of evidence of motivation will
be necessary to prove that a seniority system is not bona fide. However,
the exact quantum of proof will only be defined in future litigation.
Wayne A. Shullaw
THE TRADITIONAL BAN ON ADVERTISING BY ATTORNEYS
AND THE EXPANDING SCOPE OF THE FIRST AMENDMENT
As a part of its regulation of the State Bar, the Arizona Supreme
Court imposed and enforced a disciplinary rule that restricted advertising
by attorneys. In March of 1974 the defendants, members of the State Bar,
opened a "legal clinic" intending to provide legal services at modest fees
to people of moderate income who did not qualify for government spon-
sored legal aid. The attorneys relied on a high volume, low profit per
client practice and handled only routine matters that could be disposed of
speedily. After two years of limited success, the defendants placed an
advertisement in a newspaper which stated that they offered "legal serv-
ices at very reasonable fees" and which listed their fees for certain
services. Both defendants admitted that the advertisement was a clear
violation of the Arizona State Bar Association's Disciplinary Rules. The
United States Supreme Court held in a 5-4 decision that the regulation
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violated the defendants' first amendment right to freedom of commercial
speech by preventing them from publishing a truthful advertisement con-
cerning the availability and price of certain routine legal services in a
newspaper of general circulation.' Bates v. State Bar of Arizona, 97 S.
Ct. 2691 (1977).2
The origin of the traditional ban on the advertising of services and
prices by lawyers is rooted deep in English history along with the correla-
tive "evil" of solicitation.3 Both advertising and solicitation have historic-
ally been derided as undesirable attempts to "stir up litigation." 4 Conse-
quently the early English restrictions in this area were formulated to
prevent barratry, champerty and maintenance,' but the early restrictions
placed on advertising and solicitation did not appear in their strict form in
America until 1887.6 In 1908, the American Bar Association adopted the
Canons of Professional Ethics at its thirty-first annual meeting in Seattle,
Washington,' which were replaced in 1969 with the Code of Professional
1. The Court also held unanimously that the State Bar Association's regula-
tion of the activities of members of the State Bar fell within the Parker v. Brown,
317 U.S. 341 (1943), state action exemption to the Sherman Antitrust Act, 15 U.S.
C. §§ 1-2 (1970). A full treatment of the court's decision concerning the Sherman
Act claim is beyond the scope of this note. Essentially, the U.S. Supreme Court
affirmed the Arizona Supreme Court's decision that the state action exemption of
Parker v. Brown barred the appellants' Sherman Act claim. The Court distinguished
Goldfarb v. Virginia State Bar, 421 U.S. 773 (1975), and Cantor v. Detroit Edison
Co., 428 U.S. 579 (1976), from the instant case, noting that its finding of the state
action exemption in the instant case is in full accord with its decision in those cases.
2. A rehearing was timely applied for.
3. See Note, Advertising, Solicitation and the Profession's Duty to Make
Legal Counsel Available, 81 YALE L.J. 1181 (1972) [hereinafter cited as
Solicitation]. This gives an excellent account of the history of advertising and
solicitation.
4. See id. at 1181-82.
5. "Barratry" is defined as the offense of frequently exciting and stirring up
quarrels and suits [BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 190 (4th rev. ed. 1975); "champerty"
as a bargain to divide the proceeds of litigation between the owner of the liquidated
claim and a party supporting or enforcing the litigation (id. at 292); and "mainte-
nance" as malicious or officious intermeddling with a suit that does not belong to
one, by assisting either party with money or otherwise to prosecute or defend (id. at
1106). See also Solicitation, supra note 3, at 1182.
6. The first Code of Professional Ethics in the United States was the Code
written and adopted by the Alabama State Bar Association in 1887. H. DRINKER,
LEGAL ETHICS 23, n.7 (1953). For the complete text of the 1887 Alabama Code, see
id. at 352-63.
7. The Canons of Professional Ethics up to and including Canon 32 were
adopted in 1908. Canons 33 to 46 were adopted at later dates. Canon 27 dealt with
the subject at issue, Advertising, Direct or Indirect. In pertinent part it read:
The most worthy and effective advertisement possible, even for a young
lawyer, and especially with his brother lawyers, is the establishment of a well-
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Responsibility.8 The Code prohibits all advertising and solicitation, except
certain precisely delineated advertisements in legal directories, reputable
law lists and the classified sections of telephone books.9 There is also a
narrow exception to allow certain non-profit organizations, such as legal
aid societies, to advertise within limited strictures.I° The violation of one
of the Code's Disciplinary Rules will subject an attorney to censure,
suspension or disbarment."
merited reputation for professional capacity and fidelity to trust. This cannot
be forced . . . . [Slolicitation of business by circulars or advertisements.. .
is unprofessional . . . . Indirect advertisement . . . and all other like self-
laudation, defy the traditions and lower the tone of our high calling, and are
intolerable.
ABA CANONS OF PROFESSIONAL ETHICS 12 (1936). See also ABA COMM. ON
PROFESSIONAL ETHICS, OPINIONS, No. 1 (1924) (canon 27 prohibits solicitation from
other lawyers as well as from laymen).
8. ABA CODE OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY (1971). It has been concluded
that Canon 2 codified the existing rules against advertising and solicitation as found
in the old Canon 27 and the appropriate opinions of the ethics committee. See
Smith, Canon 2: "A Lawyer Should Assist the Legal Profession in Fulfilling its Duty
to Make Legal Counsel Available," 48 TEX. L. REV. 285, 290-96 (1970); Solicita-
tion, supra note 3, at 1182.
9. ABA CODE OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY, DR 2-101, 2-102. It should
be noted that the ABA Code was adopted by the Louisiana Bar Association and
approved by the Louisiana Supreme Court with some modification and became
effective on July 1, 1970. Articles of Incorporation of the Louisiana State Bar
Association, Article XVI. When a provision of the ABA Code, which was adopted
in Arizona, is discussed in this casenote, any difference in the corresponding
provision of the Louisiana Code will be noted. See also note 68, infra.
10. ABA CODE OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY, DR 2-103(D)(5). This was a
very narrow recognition of the United States Supreme Court's pronouncements in
the prepaid legal services cases. See note 19, infra.
In the Louisiana Code, this provision is reflected in DR 2-103(D)(4). Even these
relaxations of the traditional ban on advertising reflect only as much as the Supreme
Court mandates, to the extent that the ABA Code provides: "That a lawyer may
cooperate with the organization only in those instances and to the extent that
controlling constitutional interpretation at the time of the rendition of the services
requires .... ." Id.
11. "The Canons are statements of 'axiomatic norms'.. They embody the
general concepts from which the Ethical Considerations and Disciplinary Rules are
derived.
The Ethical Considerations are aspirational in character and represent the
objectives toward which every member of the profession should strive . ...
Disciplinary Rules . . . are mandatory in nature; [they] state the minimum
level of conduct below which no lawyer can fall without being subject to discipli-
nary action." ABA CODE OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY, Preamble.
For violation of a disciplinary rule in Louisiana a lawyer may be disciplined by
reprimand, either public or private, suspension or disbarment. Articles of Incorpo-
ration of the Louisiana State Bar Association, Article XV, Section 5.
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It is doubtful that the reasons currently given for the continued
enforcement of these restrictions are justified by the origin of the restric-
tions. 2 Today, the "traditional ban against advertising by lawyers . . . is
rooted in public interest."' 3 The ban on advertising and solicitation has
been justified as preventing "the assertion of fraudulent claims, the
corruption of public officials, the stirring up of litigation, [and] attacks on
marital stability."' 4 The ban also is designed to prevent lawyers from
overreaching, overcharging, underrepresenting and misrepresenting the
public, as well as to maintain the dignity of the legal profession.' 5
However, as people have become more conscious of the importance of
access to the courts as a means of resolving disputes, the legal assaults on
these restraints have become increasingly intense.
The first amendment has been the vehicle for most of these attacks. ' 6
In NAACP v. Button,' 7 the United States Supreme Court held that the
right of association for purposes of legal representation is a first amend-
ment right which cannot be infringed by the state absent a compelling state
interest.'" The Court has found the "compelling state interest" lacking
which might have restricted the first amendment right of association in at
least three decisions following Button. 19
12. See H. DRINKER, LEGAL ETHICS 212 (1953). See also Solicitation, supra
note 3, at 1181 n.5.
13. ABA CODE OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY, EC 2-9. "Competitive ad-
vertising would encourage extravagant, artful, self-laudatory brashness in seeking
business and thus could mislead the layman. Furthermore it would inevitably
produce unrealistic expectations . . . and bring about distrust of the law and
lawyers." Id.
The term "self-laudatory" is not defined, nor was it contained in the old Canon
27; thus its meaning may "vary as the chancellors foot." S. THURMAN, E. PHILLIPS
& E. CHEATHAM, THE LEGAL PROFESSION 545 n.21 (1970).
14. Solicitation, supra note 3, at 1184.
15. Id.
16. Id. at 1181.
17. 371 U.S. 415 (1963).
18. Id. at 444.
19. UTU v. State Bar of Mich., 401 U.S. 576 (1971); UMW v. Illinois State Bar
Ass'n, 389 U.S. 217 (1967); Brotherhood of R.R. Trainmen v. Virginia State Bar,
377 U.S. 1 (1964).
In each of these cases, the relationship between the lawyer, the client and the
sponsoring organization varied slightly. In Button the NAACP furnished a staff
lawyer to aid the potential litigant. 371 U.S. at 420. In Trainmen the union officials
provided the names of union approved private attorneys to the potential litigant
who paid the attorney. 377 U.S. at 4. In UMW a lawyer who was on the union
payroll handled the claims for the union members and their covered dependents.
389 U.S. at 219. In UTU the union recommended union legal counsel to its
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As the barrier against legal advertising and solicitation by certain
organizations was being torn down by Button and its progeny, another
traditional barrier against legal advertising, the exclusion of "commercial
speech" from first amendment protection, was being attacked by advo-
cates who felt that these restrictions were not only unconstitutional but also
against the public interest. The "commercial speech exemption"
originated in Valentine v. Chrestensen20 where the Supreme Court held
that a city ordinance forbidding distribution of commercial and business
advertising material did not abridge the petitioner's first amendment right
to freedom of speech, even though the handbill contained a protest against
certain official action. The Court stated that the handbill was "purely
commercial speech," with the protest added simply to circumvent the
ordinance. 2
1
Although the Supreme Court has continued to recognize the "com-
mercial speech" exception since Chrestensen, time and again the Court
has circumvented the doctrine by finding that the speech in question was
not "purely commercial." In fact, since the case of Breard v. Alexan-
dria,22 in which the Supreme Court upheld the conviction of a salesman
for violation of a city ordinance prohibiting door-to-door solicitation of
magazine subscriptions, the Supreme Court has never denied protection
on this ground. 23 So often has the Court eroded the Chrestensen doctrine,
that now it is almost beyond dispute that speech does not lose its first
members and the union had an agreement with the attorneys that the fees would not
exceed twenty-five per cent of the recovery. 401 U.S. at 577.
Indeed, the court noted in UTU that "the common thread running through our
decisions in [Button, Trainmen and UMW] is that collective activity undertaken to
obtain meaningful access to the courts is a fundamental right within the protection
of the first amendment." Id. at 585 (emphasis added).
The first amendment was found applicable to the states through the fourteenth
amendment in Schneider v. State, 308 U.S. 147, 160 (1939).
20. 316 U.S. 52 (1942).
21. Id. Challenges directed against the states' power under the United States
Constitution to regulate professional advertising have been brought under provi-
sions other than the first amendment. In Head v. New Mexico Board of Examiners,
374 U.S. 424 (1963), the Court held that the state regulation of advertising by
optometrists was not an unconstitutional burden on interstate commerce. Similarly,
appellants Bates and O'Steen urged that the disciplinary rule on advertising was
violative of due process and equal protection, but the issues were not addressed by
the Court in Bates. 97 S. Ct. at 26% n.9.
22. 341 U.S. 622, 642-43 (1951).
23. Virginia State Bd. of Pharmacy v. Virginia Citizens Consumer Council,
Inc., 425 U.S. 748, 759 (1976). See also Bigelow v. Virginia, 421 U.S. 809, 820 n.6
(1975), citing Mr. Justice Douglas' observation in Cammarano v. United States, 358
U.S. 498, 514 (1959) (concurring opinion), that the Valentine v. Chrestensen "ruling
was casual, almost offhand. And it has not survived reflection."
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amendment protection "merely because the speech in question happens to
be a paid commercial advertisement .... ,,24 Speech has been accorded
first amendment protection although it was in a form which was sold for
profit, 25 or involved a solicitation to pay or contribute money,26 or where
the speaker's interest was largely economic. 27 The Court's trend of re-
stricting the application of the "purely commercial" speech exception
continued until the Chrestensen commercial speech doctrine almost disap-
peared. 28
In Virginia State Board of Pharmacy v. Virginia Citizens Consumer
Council, Inc. ,29 the Court struck a final telling blow to the commercial
speech exception by striking down a prohibition against advertising by
pharmacists on the rationale that" [i]f there is a kind of commercial speech
that lacks all first amendment protection . . . it must be distinguished by
its content. Yet the speech whose content deprives it of protection cannot
24. Bigelow v. Virginia, 421 U.S. 809, 818 (1975) ("The existence of a 'commer-
cial activity' itself, is no justification for narrowing the protection of expression
secured by the first amendment."). See also Virginia State Bd. of Pharmacy v.
Virginia Citizens Consumer Council, Inc., 425 U.S. 748, 761 (1976) ("It is clear, for
example, that speech does not lose its first amendment protection because money is
spent to project it, as in a paid advertisement of one form or another."); Buckley v.
Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 16-17 (1975) ("Some forms of communication made possible by
the giving and spending of money involve speech alone, some involve conduct
primarily, and some involve a combination of the two. Yet this court has never
suggested that the dependence of a communication on the expenditure of money
operates itself to introduce a nonspeech element or to reduce the exacting scrutiny
required by the first amendment."); New York Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254,
266 (1963) ("To avoid placing such a handicap upon the freedoms of expression, we
hold that if the allegedly libelous statements would otherwise be constitutionally
protected from the present judgment, they do not forfeit that protection because
they were published in the form of a paid advertisement."); Murdock v. Pennsylva-
nia, 319 U.S. 105, 111 (1943) ("The right to use the press for expressing one's views
is not to be measured by the protection afforded commercial handbills. It should be
remembered that the pamphlets of Thomas Paine were not distributed free of
charge. ").
25. Smith v. California, 361 U.S. 147 (1959).
26. Virginia State Bd. of Pharmacy v. Virginia Citizens Consumer Council,
Inc., 425 U.S. 748, 761 (1976); New York Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 266
(1963); Cantwell v. Connecticut, 310 U.S. 307 (1939).
27. NLRB v. Gissel Packing Co., Inc., 395 U.S. 575, 617-18 (1969). See also
Thornhill v. Alabama, 310 U.S. 88, 102 (1939).
28. See Bigelow v. Virginia, 421 U.S. 809 (1975), where the Court stated that
the Chrestensen holding was distinctly limited and merely a "reasonable regulation
of the manner in which commercial advertising could be distributed." Id. at 819.
See also Virginia State Bd. of Pharmacy v. Virginia Citizens Consumer Council,
Inc., 425 U.S. 748, 760 (1976).
29. 425 U.S. 748 (1976).
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simply be speech on a commercial subject." ' 3° Thus the Chrestensen
commercial speech exception faded into constitutional history as the Court
acknowledged not only a first amendment right to advertise, but also the
reciprocal first amendment right to receive the advertising.
3
'
Once the Court determines that a constitutional right is involved, then
the state can regulate or prohibit the exercise of that right only by
demonstrating the existence of a sufficiently compelling state interest that
demands the regulation.32 In Pharmacy Board the Court weighed the
benefits of advertising to the public against the state's interest in regulating
the pharmaceutical profession, and found that the balance tipped in favor
of the public's interest in a more informed and reliable economic decision-
making.33 The state asserted that advertising would undermine profes-
sionalism among licensed pharmacists, resulting in an inferior prepara-
tion, maintenance and delivery of prescription drugs, and that advertising
would degrade the pharmacist from a skilled, specialized professional to
the position of a shopkeeper. 34 Since 95% of the prescription drugs were
prepackaged before reaching the pharmacy, the Supreme Court concluded
that the state could not prohibit price advertising for those drugs since it
was not misleading or deceptive and would not affect the professionalism
of druggists. 35
It is noted in Pharmacy Board that only the regulation of advertising
by pharmacists is considered and that the Court expressed no opinion on
advertising of services by doctors and lawyers because of the increased
possibility for deception and confusion in those areas. 36 That issue which
the Court had so carefully avoided was presented to it by Bates.
30. Id. at 761.
31. Id. at 757 and cases cited therein.
32. NAACP v. Button, 371 U.S. 415 (1%3).
33. 425 U.S. at 763.
34. Id. at 768.
35. Id. at 773.
36. Id. at 773 n.25: "We stress that we have considered in this case the
regulation of commercial advertising by pharmacists. Although we express no
opinion as to other professions, the distinctions, historical and functional, between
professions, may require consideration of quite different factors. Physicians and
lawyers, for example, do not dispense standardized products; they render profes-
sional services of almost infinite variety and nature, with consequent enhanced
possibility for confusion and deception if they were to undertake certain kinds of
advertising." (emphasis in original). See Goldfarb v. Virginia State Bar, 421 U.S.
773, 792 (1975):
We recognize that the states have a compelling interest in the practice of
professions within their boundaries, and that as part of their power to protect
the public health, safety, and other valid interests they have broad power to
19771
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In the instant case the Court summarized the Pharmacy Board case in
particular detail and declared that the result here "might be said to follow
a fortiori from it."37 From this foundation the Court recognized that the
first amendment freedom of speech encompasses an attorney's right to
advertise and the public's reciprocal right to receive such advertising
unless the state can show some compelling state interest that mandates the
prohibition. In an attempt to justify the prohibitions against advertising,
the State Bar presented six arguments to the Court.3 8 It was argued that
those six justifications of the ban on advertising by attorneys accomplished
two legitimate state interests: protecting the public from false, deceptive
establish standards for licensing practitioners and regulating the practice of
professions.
The interest of the states in regulating lawyers is especially. great since
lawyers are essential to the primary governmental function of administering
justice, and have historically been "officers of the courts."
See also Branca & Steinberg, Attorney Fee Schedules and Legal Advertising: The
Implications of Goldfarb, 24 U.C.L.A. L. REV, 475, 506-08 (1977); Morgan, The
Evolving Concept of Professional Responsibility, 90 HARV. L. REV. 702 (1977);
Note, Sherman Act Scrutiny of Bar Restraints on Advertising by Attorneys, 62 VA.
L. REV. 1135 (1976) [herinafter cited as Sherman Act Scrutiny].
37. 97 S. Ct. at 2700.
38. Briefly stated, the justifications and responses were as follows:
(1) Advertising will bring about commercialism which will adversely affect the
attorney's sense of dignity and self-worth, and thereby "irreparably damage the
delicate balance between the lawyer's need to earn and his obligation to selflessly
serve." The Court found the connection "severely strained." 97 S. Ct. at 2701.
(2) Advertising of legal services will be unavoidably misleading because (a)
services are so individualized as to prevent an informed comparison on the basis of
the advertisement, (b) the consumer cannot tell in advance what service he needs,
and (c) advertising will highlight irrelevant factors. The Court found (a) only routine
services are susceptible of advertising, (b) the consumer can recognize his needs at
the "level of generality" to which advertising lends itself and (c) the alternative of
prohibition of all advertising is an unacceptable solution to this potential problem.
97 S. Ct. at 2703.
(3) Advertising will "stir up litigation." The Court found that utilization of the
courts was not inherently evil. 97 S. Ct. at 2704.
(4) Advertising will raise fees because advertising expense will be recouped in
fees charged. The Court found this argument "dubious at best and ... irrelevant
to the First Amendment." 97 S. Ct. at 2705.
(5) Advertising will encourage the "cutting of corners" to perform the "X
service at the Y price." The Court found that an attorney so inclined would do so
despite the rule on advertising. 97 S. Ct. at 2706.
(6) Total restriction is necessary due to lack of machinery for policing the
profession. The Court postulates that regardless of the rule on advertising, the
majority of attorneys will continue to act so as to uphold the honor and integrity of
the profession. 97 S. Ct. at 2706.
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or misleading advertising by attorneys and preventing any adverse effects
on the legal profession as a result of such advertising. 39
There was a substantial similarity between the justifications for up-
holding the ban on advertising in the instant case and those urged in
Pharmacy Board. As in Pharmacy Board, the arguments in Bates failed
to convince the Court that the state's interests were so compelling as to
justify a complete intrusion upon constitutionally protected rights. In
Pharmacy Board the issue was "I will sell you the X prescription drug at
the Y price'4° and the decision was based on the delivery of standard-
ized, prepackaged prescription drugs;41 in Bates the legal services in
question were "routine legal matters.''42 In Pharmacy Board the Court
noted that there was a tremendous disparity in prices for the same specified
prescription drug (up to 1200%);43 in Bates the Court cited extensive
ABA surveys showing the inadequate delivery of legal services to the
public, especially to the middle income American who fails to seek legal
aid primarily due to his fear of the cost." The Bates Court regarded
39. See note 38, supra.
40. Virginia State Bd. of Pharmacy v. Virginia Citizens Consumer Council,
Inc., 425 U.S. at 761.
41. Id. at 773-74.
42. 97 S. Ct. at 2701.
43. 425 U.S. at754n.1l.
44. 97 S. Ct. at 2702 n.22.
If it is accepted as a premise that the Supreme Court is an instrument of social
change, then the decision was to some degree foreseeable. For the last twenty years
or so the Court and the ABA have become increasingly concerned about the
delivery of legal services. See note 19, supra. The single greatest barrier noted as a
reason for not seeking the services of a lawyer is the actual or feared cost of the
services. ABA REVISED HANDBOOK ON PREPAID LEGAL SERVICES 2 (1972). In one
survey 46.7% of the working class families involved cited cost as the reason for not
using an attorney. E. Koos, THE FAMILY AND THE LAW 7 (1948). In another survey,
514 out of 1,040 gave the expected cost as the reason for not seeking an attorney's
services. P. MURPHY & S. WALKOWSKI, COMPILATION OF REFERENCE MATERIALS
ON PREPAID LEGAL SERVICES 2-3 (1973).
Despite this reluctance to use the services of an attorney due to the feared,
expected cost, it becomes more tragic when the fear may be unrealistic. In a 1976
study middle class consumers overestimated lawyers' fees by 91% for drawing a
simple will, 34% for reading and advising on a two page installment sales contract,
and 123% for 30 minutes of consultation. Petition of the Board of Governors of the
District of Columbia Bar for Amendments to Rule X of the Rules Governing the Bar
of the District of Columbia (1976), cited in 97 S. Ct. at 2702 n.22.
The Bates Court cites the above statistics and takes judicial notice of the fact
that the appellants worked with the Maricopa Legal Aid Society for two years
before opening their clinic; their intended clientele were those of moderate income
who did not qualify for the government sponsored legal aid societies. Given this
reason as the basic policy consideration underlying the decision, future cases may
1977]
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"'routine' legal services as essentially no different for purposes of the
first amendment analysis from prepackaged prescription drugs." 45
The Court concluded that the ban's justifications were based on a
"highly paternalistic protectiveness" by the state and on the state's prefer-
ence for maintaining the public in ignorance. 4 Justice Blackmun, writing
for the majority as he did in Pharmacy Board, announced that the public
dissemination of factual information is not in itself inherently or inevitably
harmful.47 The potential for harm caused by such information is for the
most part negated by the public's increased ability to make judgments and
comparisons based on the information gained through the advertisement.48
If the state intends to protect the interests of the public, the Court felt that
the best means to that end is to open the channels of communication
rather than to close them. The choice between dangers of suppressing
information and the dangers arising from its free flow was seen as
precisely the choice that the first amendment makes for us.49
Despite the Court's holding that the state had not shown the requisite
compelling state interest to justify the total ban on all legal advertising or
on the truthful, fair, non-misleading advertising in the instant case, the
Court did recognize in dictum that the state will have some continued basis
for regulation of legal advertising. 50
be distinguished on the nature of the practice. 97 S. Ct. at 2693-94. See also
Sherman Act Scrutiny, supra note 40.
45. 97 S. Ct. at 2713 (Powell, J., dissenting).
46. 97 S. Ct. at 2699.
47. Id.
48. Id. "A corollary of this . . . would be that where consumers are fully
capable, through common sense or simple observation, of protecting their interests
against advertising exaggerations or distortions, there would be no reason for law to
intervene." Pitofsky, Beyond Nader: Consumer Protection and the Regulation of
Advertising, 90 HARV. L. REV. 661, 671-72 (1977).
The key is a "well-informed" public, for unless some means is provided to
inform the public, "common sense" or "simple observation" would be entirely
inadequate for a lay person to comprehend legal intricacies. See id. at 672-73.
49. 97 S. Ct. at 2699.
50. Id. at 2708.
Subsequent to the writing of this note the ABA Task Force on Lawyer Adver-
tising submitted its report on the Bates decision to the Board of Governors along
with the proposed Amendments to the ABA Code of Professional Responsibility. 46
U.S.L.W. No. 8, at 1 (1977).
The Task Force submitted two proposals to the Board of Governors with the
recommendation that they be circulated to each state supreme court and to the state
regulatory agencies. In its report, the Task Force explained that the two proposals
represent distinctly different approaches to the question of lawyer advertising, due
largely to the fact that "substantial difference[s] of opinion exist concerning the
implication of [Bates] upon a lawyer's right to advertise." Id.
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In rejecting the assertion that all legal advertising would have an
unavoidably misleading effect, the Court noted that this is only partially
true:
Although many services performed by attorneys are indeed
unique, it is doubtful that any attorney would or could advertise fixed
prices for services of this type. The only services that lend them-
selves to advertising are the routine ones: the uncontested divorce,
the simple adoption, the uncontested personal bankruptcy, the change
of name, and the like.5
The Court stated that it was expressing no opinion on the acceptability of
any advertisement which alludes to the quality of the legal services offered
and left resolution of this issue for another day. 2 However, the Court may
have suggested its future treatment of such advertising when it stated:
"Such claims probably are not susceptible to precise measurement or
verification and, under some circumstances, might well be deceptive or
misleading to the public or even false."
53
The Court also made it clear that it was not addressing the problem of
"in-person" solicitation, although once again it perhaps colored the issue
Proposal "A" appears to be regulatory in nature, i.e. it attempts specifically to
authorize certain types of lawyer advertising, following the basic approach of
certain federal regulatory agencies such as the Food and Drug Administration or the
Securities and Exchange Commission. Id. at 2. See note 67, infra.
Proposal "B" is more directive in nature and adopts a general anti-fraud
approach. This proposal would allow any advertisement which does not contain
information which is "false, fraudulent, misleading or deceptive." Id.
51. Id. at 2703 (emphasis supplied).
52. Id. at 2700. The Court found that the appellant's advertisement did not
contain claims of quality, "extravagant or otherwise." Justice Powell, in dissent,
did not agree with the majority on this point, but did not elaborate on his view. Id.
at 2717.
53. 97 S. Ct. at 2700. The Court has not expressly precluded all advertisements
which allude to quality of the services rendered; rather, it has said that such
advertising may be deceptive or misleading. A contrario, one may postulate that an
advertisement which is susceptible of precise measurement and verification and
which is not deceptive or misleading may be allowed. See also note 67, infra.
EC 2-9 of Proposal "A" of the ABA Amendments to Code of Professional
Responsibility seems to support this view. It provides:
Examples of information in law advertising that would be deceptive include
misstatements of fact, suggestions that the ingenuity or prior record of a lawyer
rather than the justice of the claim are the principal factors likely to determine
the result, inclusion of information irrelevant to selecting a lawyer, and repre-
sentations concerning the quality of service, which cannot be measured or
verified.
46 U.S.L.W. No. 8 (1977), at 4. (emphasis added). DR 2-101 (C)(4) of Proposal "B"
is in accord. Id. at 11.
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by stating that such an activity might well generate dangers of overreach-
ing and misrepresentation that are lacking in newspaper advertisements. 54
The special problems which are or may be associated with advertising
through the electronic media of radio and television were also reserved for
future resolution.55 The Court stated that advertisements which were for
illegal services, 56 or were false, deceptive or misleading, could be re-
gulated; 57 and that reasonable restrictions on the time, place and manner of
advertising could be imposed by the state. 58 Finally, the Court did not
54. Id. Neither ABA proposal would allow one-to-one solicitation. DR 2-104
Proposal "A", in id. at 7.
55. Id. at 2709. See also Capital Broadcasting Co. v. Mitchell, 333 F. Supp.
582, 585 (D.C. 1971), aff'd sub nom. Capital Broadcasting Co. v. Acting Attorney
Gen'l, 405 U.S. 1000 (1972), wherein the three-judge court noted that "commercial
speech" if afforded less first amendment protection than other forms of speech and
then stated, "the unique characteristics of electronic communications make it
especially subject to regulation in the public interest ....
[E]ven assuming that loss of revenue from [product] advertisements affects
petitioners with sufficient first amendment interest, petitioners, themselves, have
lost no right to speak-they have only lost an ability to collect revenue from others
from broadcasting their commercial messages." Id. at 585.
Of course this case was decided prior to Pharmacy Board and the Court's
rejection therein of the "commercial speech" exception. It is questionable whether
a total ban on advertising through the electronic media should be considered
reasonable given the Court's concern for delivery of legal services to the average
American.
In the Report to the Board of Governors by the ABA Task Force on Lawyer
Advertising, it is stated that both proposals would allow certain radio advertising
now and that if assured safeguards can be developed to effectively regulate televi-
sion advertising, then it too should be allowed. The report notes that the general
fear is that television advertising will emphasize style over substance and be thus
objectionable. However, the countervailing consideration is that large segments of
the population who, because of only marginal literacy, do not normally read printed
advertisements are regularly exposed to the electronic media. 46 U.S.L.W. No. 8,
at 2. This consideration is embodied in Proposal "A", EC 2-2 and DR 2-101. In this
respect the proposed amendments to the ABA Code of Professional Responsibility
clearly authorize advertising which was expressly reserved for consideration by
Bates at a future time. 97 S. Ct. at 2709. Therefore the proposal is more liberal than
is required by the Court's decision in Bates.
56. 97 S. Ct. at 2709, citing Pittsburg Press Co. v. Human Relations Commis-
sion, 413 U.S. 376, 388 (1973).
57. Id. at 2708.
58. Id. at 2709, citing Virginia State Bd. of Pharmacy v. Virginia Citizens
Consumer Council, Inc., 425 U.S. at 771. In Pharmacy Board, the Court said, "We
have often approved restrictions [of time, place and manner] provided that they are
justified without reference to the content of the regulated speech, that they serve a
significant governmental interest, and that in so doing they leave open ample
alternative channels for communication of the information." (emphasis added).
What will amount to an "ample alternative" commensurate with Bates? Could the
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completely foreclose the possibility of requiring an additional warning or
disclaimer to be added "even [to] an advertisement of the kind ruled on
today" to insure that the public will not be misled. 59
Although the majority opinion expressly designated the issue pre-
sented for resolution as a narrow one, the holding of the Court may not be
susceptible of such precise limitation, especially when the obscurity of the
terminology as well as the radical departure from the states' traditional
regulation of the bar are considered. 6° From Bates it is clear that an
Bar Association designate three days a month for attorneys to advertise only in a
special newspaper section?
59. 97 S. Ct. at 2709. If such a warning may be required, what Would it contain?
Perhaps a sample ad might read:
Simple Uncontested Divorce . . . . $200.00.
The fee indicated is an approximation. Individual circumstances concern-
ing alimony, child support, property rights or child custody requirements may
cause the fee to vary.
Such a warning would primarily protect the attorney by ensuring that he does
not accept a "routine" matter only to find a Medusa lying below the simple
exterior. If the Bar Associations' primary concern, however, is protecting the
consumer, the above examples resemble too closely "bait and switch" advertise-
ments that entice consumers into the advertiser's business to enable the advertiser
to sell them a totally different, usually more expensive, item. To combat this
potential problem the Bar might require the attorney to render the desired legal
service at the stated price to any clients that are attracted by the advertisement,
regardless of the difficulties which might arise. Also, the Bar might require the offer
in the advertisement to remain open for a certain period of time. For example, if the
advertisement is published in a daily newspaper, a requirement that the offer remain
open for 30 days might not be reasonable; if it is a trade journal published quarterly,
the Bar might require the offer to remain open for six months or one year.
Proposal "A" rejects the former contention and adopts the latter. DR 2-101(E)
provides: "If a lawyer advertised a fee for a service, the lawyer must render that
service for no more than the fee advertised." 46 U.S.L.W. No. 8, at 5 (1977).
DR 2-101(F) provides that if the publication in which the ad appears is publish-
ed more often than once a month, the offer must remain open for at least 30 days. If
the ad is in a publication published once a month or less, the offer must remain open
until publication of the succeeding issue. If the publication carrying the ad has no
fixed date for a succeeding publication the offer must remain open for a reasonable
period of time, but for at least one year. 46 U.S.L.W. No. 8, at 5-6.
Proposal "B" sets no such strict quidelines but relies on the general antifraud
approach which would prohibit any ad which is false, fraudulent, misleading or
deceptive. DR 2-101(A). 46 U.S.L.W. No. 8, at 10 (1977).
60. 97 S. Ct. at 2712 (Powell, J., dissenting):
Although the Court appears to note some reservations . . . . it is clear that
within undefined limits today's decision will effect profound changes in the
practice of law . . . . The supervisory power of the courts over members of
the bar, as officers of the courts and the authority of the respective States to
oversee the regulation of the profession have been weakened. . ..
I am apprehensive, despite the Court's expressed intent to proceed cau-
1977]
LOUISIANA LAW REVIEW
attorney may establish and advertise the existence of a "legal clinic." 6
1
The Court recognized, with approval, that the creation of legal "clinics"
may be a natural and appropriate consequence of the removal of the
wholesale ban on advertising by attorneys. 62 The Court found that the term
"legal clinic" is not per se misleading or deceptive to the general public.
63
If the legal "clinic," however, is to be compatible with the Court's
concern for truthful, straightforward advertising, then the services which
are offered by the "clinic" might necessarily include an "emphasis on
standardized procedures for routine problems,"' the use of automatic
equipment and paralegals, and a high volume, low profit per person
business 65 offering services directed toward that clientele of moderate
income which is unable to obtain government sponsored legal aid. 66
Although one of the major issues in Bates is whether prices may be
advertised by an attorney and if so to what extent and in what context, the
only unambiguous pronouncement on the subject is that an attorney may
advertise the cost of an initial consultation. Here, as throughout the
opinion, the Court placed considerable emphasis on the caveat that any
advertising by attorneys must be truthful, fair and not misleading. 67 The
tiously, that today's holding will be viewed by tens of thousands of lawyers as
an invitation . . .to engage in competitive advertising ....
61. Id. at 2708.
62. Id. at 2706.
63. The medical profession has long advocated the use of medical clinics;
because of this fact the court felt that the public is familiar with what the term
"clinic" connotes and thus this familiarity will provide the touchstone of analogy to
the "legal clinic." Id. at 2708.
64. Id. at 2706.
65. Id. at 2694; but see id. at 2714 n.7 (Powell, J., dissenting). Mr. Justice
Powell finds no justification for naming a law practice a "clinic" merely because it
uses paralegals and automatic equipment and other modern techniques which result
in a lower cost to the client by allocating the attorney's time more efficiently.
66. Id. at 2694. See note 44, supra.
67. 97 S. Ct. at 2708-09. The Court offers little guidance to an attorney desiring
to advertise his fees for the so-called "routine matters." Without the Court's
guidance on the subject, guidelines will have to be developed by the Bar Associa-
tion and courts on a case by case basis. This is a slow process, and in order for a
portion of the guidelines to be established, an attorney would have to be accused of
unethical conduct and disciplinary proceedings instituted against him.
The Court may have noted an alternative to the above; both the instant case
and the Pharmacy Board case cite Federal Trade Commission cases as authority
for advertising regulation. Bates v. State Bar of Arizona, 97 S. Ct. at 2699, 2709;
Virginia State Bd. of Pharmacy v. Virginia Citizens Consumer Council, Inc., 425
U.S. at 765. Since this is an already highly developed area and consumer oriented,
this may prove to be a valuable source of guidance to attorneys after the Bates
decision. See Pitofsky, supra note 48, at 661. This is an excellent article concerning
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Court declined to distinguish between placing such an advertisement in a
newspaper and placing the initial consultation fee in the classified section
of a telephone book, the latter having been approved by the American Bar
Association's Code of Professional Responsibility. 68 Arguing in dissent,
advertising regulation and discusses the possibility of FTC regulation and jurispru-
dence providing a basis for policing the advertising resulting from the Pharmacy
Board case.
The Federal Trade Commission Act declares that "deceptive" or "unfair" acts
or practices are unlawful. 15 U.S.C. § 45 (a)(T)(1970). A violation of this act may
give grounds for suit to either the injured consumers or competitors of the advertis-
er. The standard from which "deception" is measured has been the "average"
person in the audience to which the ad is directed while noting that many who are
unsophisticated and unwary may be misled. For example, one ad, which is directed
at children, could be ruled "deceptive" while the same ad, directed toward an adult
audience, might not be deceptive. Likewise, vague claims or in some cases silence
can be deceptive if the ad is reasonably susceptible of being understood by a
substantial portion of the target audience in a way that is false. If an ad can
reasonably be interpreted in more than one way, it is deceptive. In other circum-
stances the commission will view the ad and if the total impression generated by the
ad is false, literal truth will be reflected as "deceptive." When an ad is shown to be
misleading, materiality and casuality as to whether the ad induced the purchase are
irrelevant. Only the potential to deceive is necessary, not actual deception.
The concept of "unfairness" as an independent basis for challenging advertis-
ing claims is relatively new. The U.S. Supreme Court recognized this in FTC v.
Sperry & Hutchinson Co., 405 U.S. 233 (1972), when the court allowed the FTC to
develop rules concerning "unfairness." There are three principal areas where
nondeceptive advertisement might be barred as unfair: (1) claims which are promul-
gated without prior substantiation, (2) claims which tend to overreach or to exploit
particularly vulnerable groups, and (3) instances where the seller fails to make
information known to the consumer which is necessary to choose between compet-
ing products. Pitofsky, supra note 48.
In Bates, the majority states that the Bar retains the power to "correct
omissions that have the effect of presenting an inaccurate picture, the preferred
remedy is more disclosure rather than less." 97 S. Ct. at 2704. Corrective advertis-
ing also has a well developed counterpart in the arena of FTC regulation. Generally
to justify correcting an ad, the FTC Commissioner must prove:
(1) the existence of a material fraud or deception with respect to a major
advertising theme; and (2) that the fraud created a misconception in the minds
of a substantial number of consumers which is consistent with the fraud; and
(3) the misconception significantly influenced the purchase of the product at
the time suit was brought.
The usual corrective advertising order has required the violator to discontinue
advertising for one year or to disseminate a corrective message that accounts for
25% of the advertiser's advertising budget for a one year period. See also Solicita-
tion, supra note 3, at 1196-99.
68. The ABA Code was apparently adopted in toto in Arizona. This explains
why the Court makes reference to the ABA Code throughout the opinion. 97 S. Ct.
at 2698 n. 15. It should be noted that the Louisiana Code of Professional Responsi-
bility is substantially different. The ABA Code provision relative to allowable
advertising follows with that part which was omitted in Louisiana italicized.
1977]
LOUISIANA LAW REVIEW
Justice Powell stated that he would allow a disclosure of the attorney's
hourly charge;69 whereas Chief Justice Burger would have allowed the
attorney to designate only a "range" of fees.7" This they felt would lessen
the chances of misleading the public.71 It may be of considerable impor-
tance that all of the Justices (except Justice Rehnquist) would allow the
disclosure of the initial consultation fee.72 In seeking to justify the adver-
tisement in question which stated that the prices were "reasonable" the
Court deviated from the manner in which the Code of Professional Re-
sponsibility determines the reasonableness of a fee. The Court justified the
fee as reasonable solely upon an examination of prices customarily charg-
ed in the locality for similar services.
73
6) A listing in a reputable law list, legal directory, or the classified section of a
telephone company directory ....
The published data may include only the following: ...a statement of legal
fees for an initial consultation or the availability upon request of a written schedule
of fees or an estimate of the fee to be charged for the specific services. . .. ABA
CANONS OF PROFESSIONAL ETHICS, DR 2-102 (A); LOUISIANA CODE OF PROFES-
SIONAL RESPONSIBILITY, DR 2-102 (A).
69. 97 S. Ct. at 2717.
70. Id. at 2711.
71. Id. Both proposals would allow advertisement of "fixed or contingent fees
for specific legal service, the description of which would not be misunderstood or
be deceptive." Proposal "B", 46 U.S.L.W. No. 8, at 11 (1977), DR 2-101(B)(6)(b);
Proposal "A", 46 U.S.L.W. No. 8, at 4 (1977), DR 2-101(B)(25).
In keeping with the general scheme of the proposals, proposal "A" sets out
guidelines for contingent fees [DR 2-10](B)(22)], range of fees [DR 2-101(B)(23)],
hourly rate [DR 2-101(B)(24)] and fixed fee for specific legal services [DR 2-
101(B)(25)] in particular detail. 46 U.S.L.W. No. 8, at 5 (1977). See note 50, supra.
72. Id. at 2703, 2711, 2717. That raises an interesting question: may an attorney
advertise that there is no charge for the initial consultation? All discussion in Bates
implies that the fee will consist of a sum of money. The proposed ABA Amend-
ments might prohibit this as "hucksterism." ABA Code of Professional Respon-
sibility Amendments, Proposal "A", 46 U.S.L.W. No. 8, at 4 (1977), DR 2-101
(C)(6).
73. Id. at 2708. The majority compared the costs of an uncontested divorce in
the vicinity of appellant's practice with the appellant's advertised cost of $175 plus
$20 court filing fee. Since the rates ranged from $150 to $300, the Court concluded
that the price was indeed "reasonable" as advertised by the appellant. But the fee
customarily charged in an area has not been the sole factor used to determine the
reasonableness of fees. The factors that are to be considered in determining the
reasonableness of a fee. are:
(1) The time and labor required, the novelty and difficulty of the questions
involved, and the skill requisite to perform the legal service properly. (2) The
likelihood, if apparent to the client, that the acceptance of the particular-
employment will preclude other employment by the lawyer. (3) The fee cus-
tomarily charged in the locality for similar legal services. (4) The amount
involved and the results obtained. (5) The time limitation imposed by the
client or by the circumstances. (6) The nature and length of the professional
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If the Court did indeed feel that the result in the instant case flows a
fortiori from the Virginia Pharmacy Board case, then the inescapable
conclusion is that the "routine legal matters" and "the like" in question
are analagous to standardized, prepackaged name brand drugs. 4 The key
words, "routine" and "the like," were not defined expressly by the
Court, either in the majority opinion or in the dissent. Regrettably, the
Court gave little guidance on the precise character of "routine matters"
other than the analogy to prepackaged drugs and the fact that the Court
approved the four catagories of services offered by the defendants, i.e. the
uncontested divorce, the simple adoption, simple personal bankruptcies
and changes of name and the like. The Court by adding the phrase "and
the like" to the above list recognized that there are some other services
which would be considered "routine." Justice Powell pointed out that a
potential client could be seriously misled or deceived if he read the
advertised service as embracing all of his possible needs. A host of
problems can accompany divorce. 75 Several other difficulties arise in an
attempt to define which services are "routine." Does a service become
"routine" if it is rendered by the average attorney in practice in the
locality or is a "routine" service based on the competence and experience
of each attorney?7 6 It may also depend on the location" and the clientele to
which the advertisement is directed. 78
The Court only addressed the issue of publication of an advertisement
in a newspaper and expressly excluded from consideration "in-person"
solicitations and the use of radio and television, but failed to discuss the
different forms of media which lie between these extremes, e.g., maga-
zines of general circulation, trade magazines and billboards.
79
There is reason to believe that even the narrowest reading of the
relationship with the client. (7) The experience, reputation, and ability of the
lawyer or lawyers performing the service. (8) Whether the fee is fixed or
contingent.
ABA CODE OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY, DR 2-106(B) (emphasis added).
74. Id. at 2713. See text at note 45, supra.
75. Id. at 2713. Such problems include alimony, support and maintenance for
children; child custody; visitation rights; interest in life insurance, community
property, tax refunds and tax liabilities; and the disposition of other property rights.
76. "A particular service may be quite routine to a lawyer who has specialized
in that area for many years. The marital trust provisions of a will, for example, are
routine to the experienced tax and estate lawyer," yet this might be anything but
routine to a fresh law school graduate. Id. at 2713-14.
77. Id. at 2709, citing Feil v. FTC, 285 F.2d 879, 897 (9th Cir. 1960).
78. Id. at 2709 n.37.
79. Id. at 2718 n.12 (Powell, J., dissenting). One factor tending to limit this
view might be the relative degree of in-person solicitation involved in the above
media as opposed to newspapers.
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decision concerning direct advertising and solicitation will substantially
benefit the practicing attorney, even if he chooses not to advertise, by
removing the constant fear of discipline heretofore leveled against attor-
neys for indirect advertising and solicitation. Such a narrow reading of the
instant case should allow an attorney to place a one-quarter page com-
plimentary advertisement in a high school football program8" or to use a
metered stamp with the scales of justice represented thereon."' Under the
current Codes of Professional Responsibility,8 2 both the ABA Code and
Louisiana Code, strict prohibitions are stated against attorneys holding
themselves out as specialists in areas other than those listed. It may well be
that the Bar will relax the restraints currently imposed on attorneys who
hold another professional certification, such as licensed mechanical en-
gineers,83 Certified Public Accountants,4 or attorneys who hold a military
rank. 5 A caveat, however, is in order, for until the State Bar Association
takes steps to provide for some type of certification, the designation of a
specialty in a particular field of law may be deemed "misleading" and as
such would be subject to restraint. Alternatively, the designation of a
special title or area of practice may not be protected under Bates if the
designation represents a claim as to the "quality" of the proposed legal
service. Finally, the Court approved the advertising of a legal clinic which
bore the name of the partner-owners; the Court's attitude toward truthful,
fair, nonmisleading advertising may well prevent an attorney from practic-
ing law under an assumed name.8 6
80. LA. COMM. ON PROFESSIONAL ETHICS, OPINIONS, No. 190.
81. Id., No. 251.
82. ABA CODE OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY DR 2-105(A).
83. LA. COMM. ON PROFESSIONAL ETHICS, OPINIONS, No. 150.
84. Id., Nos. 113, 114.
85. Id., No. 154.
86. See generally Solicitation, supra note 3. See also text and note 51, supra.
Indeed, it seems that any assumed name would be misleading or deceptive to some
degree. The assumed name would likely be disallowed due to the difficulties in
testing the truthfulness empirically, or that the name asserts a quality. An assumed
name is invariably intended to promote or conceal something. Consider, for exam-
ple, "The A-] Law Firm." Under the proposed amendments to the ABA Code of
Professional Responsibility an attorney in private practice would not be allowed to
practice under a trade name or a name that is misleading as to the identity,
responsibility, or status of the attorneys practicing thereunder. The stated reason in
both proposals is that the firm name may be a factor in the selection of an attorney
and such a trade name might be misleading to the lay person. 46 U.S.L.W. No. 8, at
6, 10, (1977).
DR 2-102(B) of Proposal "A" would not allow practice under an assumed name
at all. DR 2-102(B) of Proposal "B" would not allow the practice of law under an
assumed name provided that it is false, fraudulent, misleading, or deceptive. Id.
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"In. holding that advertising by attorneys may not be subjected to
blanket suppression . . . we do not hold that advertising by attorneys may
not be regulated in any way."1 7 The duty of the bar will require it to police
the profession and to "correct omissions" that tend to mislead and also to
engage in educating and informing the public so that advertising is viewed
in its proper perspective. The Court expressed the belief that the State Bar
Associations should be a leading force in defining the precise perimeters
of acceptable advertising by attorneys. 88 This will cause some problems
for the State Bar Associations. There are more than 400,000 licensed
attorneys in the United States; the sheer size of the profession will make
regulation difficult and the enforcement of those regulations by the Bar
even more difficult.8 9 The Bar Associations may also have to wrestle with
each advertisement individually as there is no way to test the claims of an
advertisement "empirically.'"90
If this appears to be a formidable task for any bar association, then
the task which faces the Louisiana bar association may be even more
difficult. Not only will the Louisiana Bar Association have to interpret
Bates, but it must also bear in mind that some of the specific advertise-
ments which the Court in Bates approved dealt with family law, which is a
complex, specialized area under our codal regime with many attendant
87. 97 S. Ct. at 2708. The Court reflects its concern again for the public welfare
by declaring that the regulation of advertising to assure truthfulness will not dis-
courage or "chill" protected speech. Also the reasons for allowing leeway for
untruthful or misleading statements in other contexts have "little force" as to
commercial advertising. Similarly, those statements which might be overlooked or
forgiven as unimportant in other advertising, may be wholly inappropriate in the
context of legal advertising due to the unsophistication of the public concerning
legal services.
88. Id. at 2709. This duty to allow and police "restrained" advertising flows
from the ABA CANONS OF PROFESSIONAL ETHICS, EC 2-1: -[T]o facilitate the
process of intelligent selection of lawyers; and to assist in making legal services
fully available." It will be the bar's duty to assist in "[weeding] out those few who
abuse their trust." The bar is expected to play a "special role" in assuring that
advertising flows both "freely and cleanly." Id.
The report to the Board of Governors by the ABA Task Force on Lawyer
Advertising recommended that a Commission on Professional Advertising be estab-
lished to monitor the systems adopted by state bar associations and the progress of
professional advertising in other professions and to suggest improvements to the
ABA's guidelines on lawyer advertising. 46 U.S.L.W. No. 8, at 3 (1977).
In addition a special committee was suggested to study the funding and feasibil-
ity of national advertising campaigns "to educate consumers as to the utility, costs
and availability of legal services." Id.
89. 97 S. Ct. at 2715 (Powell, J., dissenting).
90. Id. at 2716.
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problems. The bar will have to weigh this as a possible effect on the Bates
decision, which is based on common law. Louisiana attorneys may be
well-advised to refrain from advertising on the basis of Bates until the
Committee on Professional Responsibility has had a chance to formulate
formal guidelines.
9 1
David Richard Taggart
91. It is possible that the Louisiana Bar Association will decline to adopt the
ABA proposals, since they are more liberal than is necessary to comply with the
Court's pronouncement in Bates. This is suggested by the Louisiana Bar Associa-
tion's conservatism in not adopting the last ABA proposal relating to advertising in
the classified section of a telephone book. See note 68, supra.
